Setiap jamaah yang berangkat umroh atau haji khusus Call/Wa. 08111-34-1212 pasti menginginkan perjalanan ibadah haji plus atau umrohnya bisa terlaksana dengan lancar, nyaman dan aman sehingga menjadi mabrur. Demi mewujudkan kami sangat memahami keinginan para jamaah sehingga merancang program haji onh plus dan umroh dengan tepat. Jika anda ingin melaksanakan Umrah dan Haji dengan tidak dihantui rasa was-was dan serta ketidakpastian, maka Alhijaz Indowisata Travel adalah solusi sebagai biro perjalanan anda yang terbaik dan terpercaya.?agenda umroh 12 hari

Saco-Indonesia.com - Penderita kanker di negara ini mendapat beban vonis dua kali. Selain usia dipastikan berakhir oleh dokter saat stadium mencapai tahap lanjut, vonis kedua adalah mahalnya ongkos harus dikeluarkan untuk obatnya.

Ambil contoh harga sorafenib, zat kimia penting bagi penderita kanker hati atau ginjal supaya perkembangan sel jahat berkurang. Seorang pasien butuh hingga Rp 50-an juta menebus obat itu buat konsumsi rutin sebulan.

Itu di luar biaya kemoterapi Rp 2-6 juta sekali sesi. Tak salah bila Yayasan Kanker Indonesia melansir kira-kira satu penderita butuh biaya Rp 102 juta per bulan untuk mempertahankan hidupnya.

Komponen obat jadi salah satu paling membebani. Hal itu dibenarkan oleh Marius Widjajarta, dokter masuk tim perumus harga obat Kementerian Kesehatan. "Obat riset itu mencakup 20 persen dari yang beredar di pasaran. Rata-rata memang untuk penyakit-penyakit berat, kanker, HIV, flu burung, dan semacamnya. Harganya mahal karena ada paten yang harus dibayarkan pada perusahaan sebagai penemunya," ujarnya kepada merdeka.com awal bulan ini.

Akan tetapi kondisi ini bukannya tanpa jalan keluar. Khususnya supaya harga obat lebih terjangkau bagi penderita penyakit kronis. Akar dari mahalnya obat paten adalah Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Ini beleid perlindungan hak paten produsen obat hasil riset wajib dipatuhi Organisasi Perdagangan Dunia (WTO).

Hal itu disampaikan pengamat isu kesehatan dari lembaga swadaya Indonesia for Global Justice, Rachmi Hertanti. Dia meyakini beban ongkos paten menjerat itu masih bisa dilobi pemerintah.

Itu berkaca pada artikel nomor 31 dari ketentuan WTO mengenai TRIPS. "Setiap anggota bebas menggunakan metode sesuai dalam mengimplementasikan ketentuan terdapat dalam perjanjian sesuai ketentuan hukum mereka miliki."

"Artinya suatu negara dibolehkan memproduksi atau mengimpor obat dari pihak ketiga, tidak harus dari pemegang paten, jika ada suatu situasi-situasi yang dianggap darurat," ujar Rachmi. "Sehingga harganya bisa jadi lebih murah."

Pemerintah bukannya tidak mengetahui celah hukum itu. Terbukti pada Oktober 2012, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono mengeluarkan keputusan presiden mengesampingkan paten dari tujuh obat HIV/AIDS dan hepatitis C dimiliki oleh Merck & Co, GlaxoSmithKline, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Abbott, dan Gilead.

Dampaknya segera dirasakan pasien karena harga obat paten langsung menjadi lebih murah. Contohnya beban belanja lopinavir dan ritonavir dibutuhkan penderita HIV memperpanjang hidupnya menjadi tak sampai Rp 100 ribu buat kebutuhan sebulan.

Rachmi menyatakan pemerintah bisa mengupayakan harga obat paten lain diturunkan meniru kebijakan buat penderita HIV. "Penyakit kanker atau jantung, sebenarnya hampir 70 persen dari penyebab kematian di negara kita, butuh kebijakan serupa," tuturnya.

Apalagi negara di kawasan sudah menjalankan negosiasi TRIPS. Ambil contoh Thailand pada 2008 menerbitkan lisensi mengabaikan paten buat beberapa jenis obat kanker. Hasilnya, harga docetaxel dan letrozol turun 24 kali lipat dari harga normal. Negeri Gajah Putih ini juga mengabaikan paten buat clopidogrel biasa dikonsumsi penderita kanker paru sehingga harganya turun 91 persen dari pasaran.

India lebih agresif lagi mengabaikan paten. Data Organisasi kemanusiaan medis internasional Medecins Sans Frontieres/Dokter Lintas Batas (MSF) menunjukkan negara itu mengabaikan paten atas sorafenib. Obat kanker itu dari awalnya seharga hampir Rp 50 juta, turun drastis menjadi hanya Rp 1,7 jutaan.

Negeri Sungai Gangga, melalui Mahkamah Agung , memaksa perusahaan obat Bayer asal Jerman pada 2012 melepas hak eksklusif paten atas bermacam obat kanker.

"Thailand dan India nyatanya berani, ini perkara kemauan politik saja," kata Rachmi menegaskan.

Masalahnya, pemerintah akhir tahun lalu justru memperlemah daya saing industri farmasi lokal melalui revisi Daftar Negatif Investasi (DNI) untuk sektor farmasi. Perusahaan luar tadinya hanya boleh menguasai 75 persen saham, kini diperbesar jatahnya menjadi 85 persen.

Situasi ini akan membuat mereka semakin dominan dibanding pabrik obat lokal. Sebab, 24 perusahaan asing beroperasi di Indonesia menguasai 80 persen pasar obat paten.

Rachmi mengingatkan kesuksesan India dan Thailand disokong oleh kesiapan farmasi lokalnya memproduksi obat tersebut. Artinya, tanpa ada industri dalam negeri kuat, pengabaian TRIPS jadi percuma. "Kalau asing semakin diperlonggar masuk ke Indonesia, dia harus diwajibkan kerja sama transfer teknologi dengan BUMN farmasi," usulnya.

Marius punya gagasan lain lagi. Dia melihat beberapa obat bermerek dikuasai farmasi asing patennya sudah kadaluarsa. Artinya, status mereka hanyalah generik bermerek. Obat-obat semacam itu, misalnya Topamax, dibutuhkan penderita epilepsi, wajib dikontrol Kementerian Kesehatan.

Dia mengaku punya data generik bermerek adalah satu satu sektor harganya gila-gilaan tanpa pernah dikontrol. "Obat merek itu harganya dilepas begitu saja. Data saya ada yang 40-60 kali lipat dari harga generiknya," kata Marius.

Ini juga perkara kemauan politik. Kenyataannya, Marius melihat data harga obat dipasok industri untuk program pemerintah dilepas hanya 3-4 kali dari biaya produksi. "Mekanisme pengendalian harga jual harus dibuat," kata Ketua Yayasan Pemberdayaan Konsumen Kesehatan Indonesia ini.

Editor : Maulana Lee

Sumber : Merdeka.com

WASHINGTON — The former deputy director of the C.I.A. asserts in a forthcoming book that Republicans, in their eagerness to politicize the killing of the American ambassador to Libya, repeatedly distorted the agency’s analysis of events. But he also argues that the C.I.A. should get out of the business of providing “talking points” for administration officials in national security events that quickly become partisan, as happened after the Benghazi attack in 2012.

The official, Michael J. Morell, dismisses the allegation that the United States military and C.I.A. officers “were ordered to stand down and not come to the rescue of their comrades,” and he says there is “no evidence” to support the charge that “there was a conspiracy between C.I.A. and the White House to spin the Benghazi story in a way that would protect the political interests of the president and Secretary Clinton,” referring to the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

But he also concludes that the White House itself embellished some of the talking points provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had blocked him from sending an internal study of agency conclusions to Congress.

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“I finally did so without asking,” just before leaving government, he writes, and after the White House released internal emails to a committee investigating the State Department’s handling of the issue.

A lengthy congressional investigation remains underway, one that many Republicans hope to use against Mrs. Clinton in the 2016 election cycle.

In parts of the book, “The Great War of Our Time” (Twelve), Mr. Morell praises his C.I.A. colleagues for many successes in stopping terrorist attacks, but he is surprisingly critical of other C.I.A. failings — and those of the National Security Agency.

Soon after Mr. Morell retired in 2013 after 33 years in the agency, President Obama appointed him to a commission reviewing the actions of the National Security Agency after the disclosures of Edward J. Snowden, a former intelligence contractor who released classified documents about the government’s eavesdropping abilities. Mr. Morell writes that he was surprised by what he found.

“You would have thought that of all the government entities on the planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been the N.S.A.,” he writes. “But it turned out that the N.S.A. had left itself vulnerable.”

He concludes that most Wall Street firms had better cybersecurity than the N.S.A. had when Mr. Snowden swept information from its systems in 2013. While he said he found himself “chagrined by how well the N.S.A. was doing” compared with the C.I.A. in stepping up its collection of data on intelligence targets, he also sensed that the N.S.A., which specializes in electronic spying, was operating without considering the implications of its methods.

“The N.S.A. had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should,” he says.

The book is to be released next week.

Mr. Morell was a career analyst who rose through the ranks of the agency, and he ended up in the No. 2 post. He served as President George W. Bush’s personal intelligence briefer in the first months of his presidency — in those days, he could often be spotted at the Starbucks in Waco, Tex., catching up on his reading — and was with him in the schoolhouse in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, when the Bush presidency changed in an instant.

Mr. Morell twice took over as acting C.I.A. director, first when Leon E. Panetta was appointed secretary of defense and then when retired Gen. David H. Petraeus resigned over an extramarital affair with his biographer, a relationship that included his handing her classified notes of his time as America’s best-known military commander.

Mr. Morell says he first learned of the affair from Mr. Petraeus only the night before he resigned, and just as the Benghazi events were turning into a political firestorm. While praising Mr. Petraeus, who had told his deputy “I am very lucky” to run the C.I.A., Mr. Morell writes that “the organization did not feel the same way about him.” The former general “created the impression through the tone of his voice and his body language that he did not want people to disagree with him (which was not true in my own interaction with him),” he says.

But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.

The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.

But he concludes that the assault in which the ambassador was killed took place “with little or no advance planning” and “was not well organized.” He says the attackers “did not appear to be looking for Americans to harm. They appeared intent on looting and conducting some vandalism,” setting fires that killed Mr. Stevens and a security official, Sean Smith.

Mr. Morell paints a picture of an agency that was struggling, largely unsuccessfully, to understand dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2011 in Tunisia. The agency’s analysts failed to see the forces of revolution coming — and then failed again, he writes, when they told Mr. Obama that the uprisings would undercut Al Qaeda by showing there was a democratic pathway to change.

“There is no good explanation for our not being able to see the pressures growing to dangerous levels across the region,” he writes. The agency had again relied too heavily “on a handful of strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab street,” he says, and those leaders themselves were clueless.

Moreover, an agency that has always overvalued secretly gathered intelligence and undervalued “open source” material “was not doing enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media,” he writes. “We thought and told policy makers that this outburst of popular revolt would damage Al Qaeda by undermining the group’s narrative,” he writes.

Instead, weak governments in Egypt, and the absence of governance from Libya to Yemen, were “a boon to Islamic extremists across both the Middle East and North Africa.”

Mr. Morell is gentle about most of the politicians he dealt with — he expresses admiration for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, though he accuses former Vice President Dick Cheney of deliberately implying a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq that the C.I.A. had concluded probably did not exist. But when it comes to the events leading up to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, he is critical of his own agency.

Mr. Morell concludes that the Bush White House did not have to twist intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s alleged effort to rekindle the country’s work on weapons of mass destruction.

“The view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on W.M.D. is just flat wrong,” he writes. “No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years, long before Bush came to office.”