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Sistem Conveyor yaitu sistem mekanis yang memilik tujuan untuk  memindahkan antar tempat(dari tempat satu ke tempat yang lain). Conveyor Seringkali Dipakai Untuk Memindahkan Barang Oleh Perusahaan Besar.

Dilihat Dari Beberapa Sudut, Conveyor Memiliki Nilai Ekonois Dalam Memindahkan barang, jika dibandingkan dengan truk. Conveyor dapat menampung barang dengan jumlah besar dan terus berlanjut (continue) dari satu tempat ke tempat lain. Perpindahan tempat tersebut harus mempunyai Tempat yang tetap untuk berhent, agar nilai ekonomis Conveyor Terlihat begitu bermanfaat. Tentu Sistem ini Memiliki Kelemahan Juga. Kelemahan sistem ini adalah tidak empunyai fleksibilitas saat lokasi barang yang dipindahkan tidak tetap dan jumlah barang yang masuk tidak Terus Menerus(continue).

Saat ini Conveyor Berkembang Menjadi eragai Jenis. Jenis-jenis conveyor tersebut antara lain Apron, Flight, Pivot, Overhead, Loadpropelling, Car, Bucket, Screw, Roller, Vibrating, Pneumatic, dan Hydraulic. Disini akan dibahas satu jenis conveyor yaitu Roller Conveyor.

ROLLER CONVEYOR

Roller conveyor adalah sistem conveyor yang penumpu utama barang yang dipindahkan adalah roller. Roller yang terdapat pada sistem ini berbeda dengan roller pada conveyor jenis yang lain. Roller pada sistem ini didesain khusus agar cocok dengan kondisi barang yang dipindahkan, misal roller diberi lapisan karet, lapisan anti karat, dan lain sebagainya. Sedangkan roller pada sistem jenis yang lain didesain cocok untuk sabuk yang ditumpunya.
 

FUNGSI DAN SPESIFIKASI ROLLER CONVEYOR

Roller conveyor hanya bisa memindahkan barang yang berupa unit dan tidak bisa memindahkan barang yang berbentuk bulk atau butiran. Unit yang bisa dipindahkan menggunakan roller conveyor juga harus mempunyai dimensi tertentu dan berat tertentu agar bisa ditransportasikan. Untuk memindahkan barang dalam bentuk bulk, bulk tersebut harus dikemas terlebih dahulu dalam unit agar bisa ditransportasikan menggunakan sistem ini.

Spesifikasi roller conveyor juga harus disesuaikan dengan dimensi dan beban unit yang akan ditransportasikan. Rancangan sistem roller conveyor harus mempu menerima beban maksimum yang mungkin terjadi pada sistem conveyor. Selain itu, desain dimensi sistem juga harus dipertimbangkan agar sesuai dengan dimensi unit yang akan ditransportasikan. Dalam beberapa kasus dimensi unit yang lebih lebar dari dimensi lebar roller masih diperbolehkan.

Jarak antar roller disesuaikan dengan dimensi unit yang akan ditransportasikan. Diusahakan jarak antar roller dibuat sedekat mungkin agar tumpuan beban semakin banyak. Selain itu, dimensi unit yang ditranportasikan minimal harus ditumpu oleh 3 roller. Jika kurang dari 3 roller, maka unit tersebut akan tersendat bahkan bisa jatuh keluar sistem tranportasi roller conveyor.

Kelebihan roller conveyor adalah bisa mentransformasikan pada kemiringan tertentu sehingga conveyor bisa mentranportasikan barang dari satu tingkat ke tingkat yang lain. Selain itu, roller conveyor juga bisa membelokkan jalur unit yang belokkannya sangat tajam. Hal tersebut bermanfaat untuk daerah yang ruanganya terbatas.

Selain itu, roller conveyor memmpunyai kemampuan untuk menggabungkan 2 jalur yang terpisah. Penggabungan 2 jalur tersebut dapat dilakukan dengan berbagai metode seperti Y-Line dan accumulating roller conveyor.

MEKANISME KERJA
Mekanisme kerja roller conveyor secara umum adalah sebagai berikut:
1.Motor penggerak memutar poros pada motor yang telah terpasang sistem transmisi menuju drive roller.
2.Putaran poros pada motor ditransmisikan ke drive roller melalui sistem transmisi yang telah dirancang khusus untuk sistem roller conveyor.
3.Drive roller yang terpasang sistem transmisi tersebut ikut berputar karena daya yang disalurkan oleh sistem transmisi.
4.Drive roller mentransmisikan putaran roller ke roller lain dengan tranmisi rantai.
5.Antar roller diberi jalur transmisi yang sama dengan perbandingan transmisi 1:1 sehingga putaran antar roller mempunyai kecepatan yang sama.
6.Tranmisi antar roller tersebut diteruskan sampai ke roller paling terakhir.

http://rollindodayasakti.com

suryaciptaconveyors.com

WASHINGTON — The former deputy director of the C.I.A. asserts in a forthcoming book that Republicans, in their eagerness to politicize the killing of the American ambassador to Libya, repeatedly distorted the agency’s analysis of events. But he also argues that the C.I.A. should get out of the business of providing “talking points” for administration officials in national security events that quickly become partisan, as happened after the Benghazi attack in 2012.

The official, Michael J. Morell, dismisses the allegation that the United States military and C.I.A. officers “were ordered to stand down and not come to the rescue of their comrades,” and he says there is “no evidence” to support the charge that “there was a conspiracy between C.I.A. and the White House to spin the Benghazi story in a way that would protect the political interests of the president and Secretary Clinton,” referring to the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

But he also concludes that the White House itself embellished some of the talking points provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had blocked him from sending an internal study of agency conclusions to Congress.

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“I finally did so without asking,” just before leaving government, he writes, and after the White House released internal emails to a committee investigating the State Department’s handling of the issue.

A lengthy congressional investigation remains underway, one that many Republicans hope to use against Mrs. Clinton in the 2016 election cycle.

In parts of the book, “The Great War of Our Time” (Twelve), Mr. Morell praises his C.I.A. colleagues for many successes in stopping terrorist attacks, but he is surprisingly critical of other C.I.A. failings — and those of the National Security Agency.

Soon after Mr. Morell retired in 2013 after 33 years in the agency, President Obama appointed him to a commission reviewing the actions of the National Security Agency after the disclosures of Edward J. Snowden, a former intelligence contractor who released classified documents about the government’s eavesdropping abilities. Mr. Morell writes that he was surprised by what he found.

“You would have thought that of all the government entities on the planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been the N.S.A.,” he writes. “But it turned out that the N.S.A. had left itself vulnerable.”

He concludes that most Wall Street firms had better cybersecurity than the N.S.A. had when Mr. Snowden swept information from its systems in 2013. While he said he found himself “chagrined by how well the N.S.A. was doing” compared with the C.I.A. in stepping up its collection of data on intelligence targets, he also sensed that the N.S.A., which specializes in electronic spying, was operating without considering the implications of its methods.

“The N.S.A. had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should,” he says.

The book is to be released next week.

Mr. Morell was a career analyst who rose through the ranks of the agency, and he ended up in the No. 2 post. He served as President George W. Bush’s personal intelligence briefer in the first months of his presidency — in those days, he could often be spotted at the Starbucks in Waco, Tex., catching up on his reading — and was with him in the schoolhouse in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, when the Bush presidency changed in an instant.

Mr. Morell twice took over as acting C.I.A. director, first when Leon E. Panetta was appointed secretary of defense and then when retired Gen. David H. Petraeus resigned over an extramarital affair with his biographer, a relationship that included his handing her classified notes of his time as America’s best-known military commander.

Mr. Morell says he first learned of the affair from Mr. Petraeus only the night before he resigned, and just as the Benghazi events were turning into a political firestorm. While praising Mr. Petraeus, who had told his deputy “I am very lucky” to run the C.I.A., Mr. Morell writes that “the organization did not feel the same way about him.” The former general “created the impression through the tone of his voice and his body language that he did not want people to disagree with him (which was not true in my own interaction with him),” he says.

But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.

The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.

But he concludes that the assault in which the ambassador was killed took place “with little or no advance planning” and “was not well organized.” He says the attackers “did not appear to be looking for Americans to harm. They appeared intent on looting and conducting some vandalism,” setting fires that killed Mr. Stevens and a security official, Sean Smith.

Mr. Morell paints a picture of an agency that was struggling, largely unsuccessfully, to understand dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2011 in Tunisia. The agency’s analysts failed to see the forces of revolution coming — and then failed again, he writes, when they told Mr. Obama that the uprisings would undercut Al Qaeda by showing there was a democratic pathway to change.

“There is no good explanation for our not being able to see the pressures growing to dangerous levels across the region,” he writes. The agency had again relied too heavily “on a handful of strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab street,” he says, and those leaders themselves were clueless.

Moreover, an agency that has always overvalued secretly gathered intelligence and undervalued “open source” material “was not doing enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media,” he writes. “We thought and told policy makers that this outburst of popular revolt would damage Al Qaeda by undermining the group’s narrative,” he writes.

Instead, weak governments in Egypt, and the absence of governance from Libya to Yemen, were “a boon to Islamic extremists across both the Middle East and North Africa.”

Mr. Morell is gentle about most of the politicians he dealt with — he expresses admiration for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, though he accuses former Vice President Dick Cheney of deliberately implying a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq that the C.I.A. had concluded probably did not exist. But when it comes to the events leading up to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, he is critical of his own agency.

Mr. Morell concludes that the Bush White House did not have to twist intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s alleged effort to rekindle the country’s work on weapons of mass destruction.

“The view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on W.M.D. is just flat wrong,” he writes. “No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years, long before Bush came to office.”