KOMPAS.com - Seiring perkembangan
waktu, perempuan kini semakin mahir dan maju dalam penguasaan teknologi. Betty Alisjahbana,
Komisaris PT Garuda Indonesia, mengungkapkan bahwa perempuan kini tak lagi memandang teknologi
sebagai hal yang aneh dan tabu.
"Mereka kini sudah mengetahui ada banyak manfaat
yang bisa diambil dan dimanfaatkan untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraan mereka dalam berbagai hal
melalui teknologi maju. Mereka pun kini sudah semakin tertantang dan mau belajar untuk menguasai
teknologi," jelas Betty, saat seminar "Kartini Next Generation" di Jakarta,
beberapa waktu lalu.
Hanya saja tak bisa dipungkiri kalau masih ada perempuan yang
beranggapan bahwa penguasaan teknologi hanya diperlukan oleh perempuan kantoran atau wirausaha.
Padahal menurut survei yang dilakukan oleh lembaga QB Leadership (lembaga yang berfokus pada
industri kreatif) yang dipimpinnya, teknologi sangat bermanfaat untuk semua perempuan, baik yang
bekerja, wirausaha, atau yang tak bekerja sekalipun.
"Untuk semua dimensi profesi
perempuan apa pun, teknologi punya peranan dan manfaatnya masing-masing," jelasnya.
Survei ini dilakukan pada tahun 2012 untuk mengetahui manfaat teknologi informasi untuk
perempuan. Pesertanya dibagi menjadi tiga kelompok, yaitu perempuan profesional, perempuan
wirausaha, dan ibu rumah tangga. Hasilnya, 95 persen perempuan entrepreneur
mengungkapkan bahwa teknologi bisa membantu mereka untuk merasa lebih sukses dibanding pria.
Dengan memanfaatkan teknologi informasi, perempuan pengusaha bisa meningkatkan kemampuan
berbinis, produktivitas, sekaligus keuntungan usaha.
"Teknologi juga akan
membantu mereka untuk menjual produk keluar negeri. Selain itu, 45 persen perempuan wirausaha
juga memanfaatkan teknologi untuk mencari supplier produk dari luar negeri untuk
menciptakan kualitas produk yang lebih baik," katanya.
Lebih jauh lagi, perempuan
pengusaha ini juga bisa memanfaatkan teknologi informasi untuk mengatur waktu kerja yang lebih
fleksibel, sehingga urusan rumah tangga bisa dikelola dengan baik.
perempuan profesional, biasanya mereka memanfaatkan teknologi ini untuk mengembangkan kemampuan
diri dan produktivitas bekerja. Misalnya untuk menyelesaikan pendidikan informal melalui
internet, mempromosikan diri untuk mendapatkan pekerjaan yang lebih baik, berhubungan dengan
klien di luar negeri, sampai membuat online workshop di seluruh dunia.
menyeimbangkan kehidupan pekerjaan dan keluarga, pekerja profesional juga sering memanfaatkan
teknologi seperti Skype untuk berhubungan dengan keluarga saat mereka harus tugas keluar kota
atau keluar negeri. Kadang-kadang mereka menggunakan internet untuk browsing berbagai
resep masakan agar bisa dipraktikkan saat hari libur sehingga bisa memanjakan keluarga.
Ibu-ibu rumah tangga yang berpartisipasi dalam survei ini juga mengungkapkan bahwa
teknologi juga memberikan banyak manfaat untuk mereka. Sekalipun tidak bekerja di luar rumah,
namun teknologi bisa membantu meningkatkan pengetahuan sehingga mereka jadi lebih pandai dan
berpikiran terbuka. Menjadi ibu rumah tangga bukan berarti tidak tahu perkembangan dan
informasi dunia luar, kan? Banyak manfaat lain yang bisa diperoleh dari teknologi.
"Ibu juga tak perlu repot saat ingin menjemput anak pulang sekolah, tinggal SMS tukang
ojek langganan dansi anak langsung dijemput ke sekolahnya. Praktis dan cepat,"
Lagipula, sekarang ini berbagai peralatan rumah tangga seperti lemari es,
mesin cuci, atau kompor, juga sudah mulai menggunakan teknologi yang canggih. Apa jadinya jika
ibu rumah tangga tak mau belajar untuk menguasai teknologi?
Ex-C.I.A. Official Rebuts Republican Claims on Benghazi Attack in ‘The Great War of Our Time’
WASHINGTON — The former deputy director of the C.I.A. asserts in a forthcoming book that Republicans, in their eagerness to politicize the killing of the American ambassador to Libya, repeatedly distorted the agency’s analysis of events. But he also argues that the C.I.A. should get out of the business of providing “talking points” for administration officials in national security events that quickly become partisan, as happened after the Benghazi attack in 2012.
The official, Michael J. Morell, dismisses the allegation that the United States military and C.I.A. officers “were ordered to stand down and not come to the rescue of their comrades,” and he says there is “no evidence” to support the charge that “there was a conspiracy between C.I.A. and the White House to spin the Benghazi story in a way that would protect the political interests of the president and Secretary Clinton,” referring to the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton.
But he also concludes that the White House itself embellished some of the talking points provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had blocked him from sending an internal study of agency conclusions to Congress.
“I finally did so without asking,” just before leaving government, he writes, and after the White House released internal emails to a committee investigating the State Department’s handling of the issue.
A lengthy congressional investigation remains underway, one that many Republicans hope to use against Mrs. Clinton in the 2016 election cycle.
In parts of the book, “The Great War of Our Time” (Twelve), Mr. Morell praises his C.I.A. colleagues for many successes in stopping terrorist attacks, but he is surprisingly critical of other C.I.A. failings — and those of the National Security Agency.
Soon after Mr. Morell retired in 2013 after 33 years in the agency, President Obama appointed him to a commission reviewing the actions of the National Security Agency after the disclosures of Edward J. Snowden, a former intelligence contractor who released classified documents about the government’s eavesdropping abilities. Mr. Morell writes that he was surprised by what he found.
“You would have thought that of all the government entities on the planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been the N.S.A.,” he writes. “But it turned out that the N.S.A. had left itself vulnerable.”
He concludes that most Wall Street firms had better cybersecurity than the N.S.A. had when Mr. Snowden swept information from its systems in 2013. While he said he found himself “chagrined by how well the N.S.A. was doing” compared with the C.I.A. in stepping up its collection of data on intelligence targets, he also sensed that the N.S.A., which specializes in electronic spying, was operating without considering the implications of its methods.
“The N.S.A. had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should,” he says.
Mr. Morell was a career analyst who rose through the ranks of the agency, and he ended up in the No. 2 post. He served as President George W. Bush’s personal intelligence briefer in the first months of his presidency — in those days, he could often be spotted at the Starbucks in Waco, Tex., catching up on his reading — and was with him in the schoolhouse in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, when the Bush presidency changed in an instant.
Mr. Morell twice took over as acting C.I.A. director, first when Leon E. Panetta was appointed secretary of defense and then when retired Gen. David H. Petraeus resigned over an extramarital affair with his biographer, a relationship that included his handing her classified notes of his time as America’s best-known military commander.
Mr. Morell says he first learned of the affair from Mr. Petraeus only the night before he resigned, and just as the Benghazi events were turning into a political firestorm. While praising Mr. Petraeus, who had told his deputy “I am very lucky” to run the C.I.A., Mr. Morell writes that “the organization did not feel the same way about him.” The former general “created the impression through the tone of his voice and his body language that he did not want people to disagree with him (which was not true in my own interaction with him),” he says.
But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.
The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.
But he concludes that the assault in which the ambassador was killed took place “with little or no advance planning” and “was not well organized.” He says the attackers “did not appear to be looking for Americans to harm. They appeared intent on looting and conducting some vandalism,” setting fires that killed Mr. Stevens and a security official, Sean Smith.
Mr. Morell paints a picture of an agency that was struggling, largely unsuccessfully, to understand dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2011 in Tunisia. The agency’s analysts failed to see the forces of revolution coming — and then failed again, he writes, when they told Mr. Obama that the uprisings would undercut Al Qaeda by showing there was a democratic pathway to change.
“There is no good explanation for our not being able to see the pressures growing to dangerous levels across the region,” he writes. The agency had again relied too heavily “on a handful of strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab street,” he says, and those leaders themselves were clueless.
Moreover, an agency that has always overvalued secretly gathered intelligence and undervalued “open source” material “was not doing enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media,” he writes. “We thought and told policy makers that this outburst of popular revolt would damage Al Qaeda by undermining the group’s narrative,” he writes.
Instead, weak governments in Egypt, and the absence of governance from Libya to Yemen, were “a boon to Islamic extremists across both the Middle East and North Africa.”
Mr. Morell is gentle about most of the politicians he dealt with — he expresses admiration for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, though he accuses former Vice President Dick Cheney of deliberately implying a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq that the C.I.A. had concluded probably did not exist. But when it comes to the events leading up to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, he is critical of his own agency.
Mr. Morell concludes that the Bush White House did not have to twist intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s alleged effort to rekindle the country’s work on weapons of mass destruction.
“The view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on W.M.D. is just flat wrong,” he writes. “No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years, long before Bush came to office.”